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ESSAY
ASSESSING JUDGESHIP NEEDS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: POLICY CHOICES AND
PROCESS CONCERNS
Arthur D. Hellman*
In March 2003, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, the policymaking body of the federal judiciary, requested
that Congress create eleven new judgeships for the federal
courts of appeals. This recommendation could not have come as
a surprise to anyone. No new federal appellate judgeships have
been created for almost fifteen years; since then, caseloads have
continued to climb. But one aspect of the recommendation might
have aroused some puzzlement. The Conference based its
request, in part, on a workload measure known as "adjusted
filings." Four courts of appeals were included in the request-
but there was no mention at all of the two courts with the highest
adjusted filings in the nation, the Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit.
* Professor of Law and Distinguished Faculty Scholar, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law. This Essay is based in part on the author's testimony at a hearing of the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary
Committee held on June 24, 2003. The author expresses his appreciation to Judge Procter
Hug, Jr., Judge Dennis Jacobs, and Professor Stephen L. Wasby for helpful comments on
earlier drafts and to Tom Welshonce, University of Pittsburgh School of Law Class of
2004, for assistance in research. The views expressed are solely those of the author.
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This omission raises two questions, one obvious and one
that lurks below the surface. The obvious question is: Why is the
Judicial Conference not seeking additional judgeships for courts
which, by its own standard, would appear to need them more
acutely than any other? Pursuit of this inquiry leads to the
second question: Does the process used by the Judicial
Conference in formulating its recommendations provide
sufficient information to enable Congress to carry out its
responsibility for creating judgeships when needed?
Those questions are the principal focus of this Essay.
However, before turning to them, it will be helpful to explain
why the Judicial Conference request is justified as far as it goes.
That in turn will require some discussion of a report by the
General Accounting Office that expresses concerns about the
standard used by the Conference in formulating its
recommendations.
The Essay has two purposes. First, I hope to promote an
informed debate among the judges and lawyers of the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits over the policies adopted by those two courts
of appeals to deal with their increased caseloads. Second, I seek
to persuade the Judicial Conference that opening up the process
by which it assesses judgeship needs will benefit not only
Congress but also the judiciary.
I. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REQUEST
The Judicial Conference asked Congress to create eleven
new judgeships for the federal courts of appeals: one for the
First Circuit, two for the Second Circuit, one for the Sixth
Circuit, and seven for the Ninth Circuit (five permanent, two
temporary).' A bill has been introduced in the Senate to
implement this request.2 At this writing, no bill has been
1. News Release, Administrative Off. of the U.S. Cts., Judicial Conference Asks
Congress to Create 57 New Judgeships (Mar. 18, 2003) (Attachment A) (available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Press Releases/303judconf.pdf) (accessed Oct. 31, 2003; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process). The Conference also asked Congress
to create forty-six additional judgeships for the federal district courts. Details of the district
court request will not be discussed in this Essay.
2. Federal Judgeship Act of 2003, S. 920, 108th Cong. (2003).
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-introduced in the House.3  However, in June 2003 the
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property
of the House Judiciary Committee held an oversight hearing on
"The Federal Judiciary: Is there a Need for Additional Federal
Judges?" 4 At that hearing, Judge Dennis Jacobs, the chair of the
Judicial Conference Committee on Judicial Resources, urged the
Subcommittee to "give full and favorable consideration to the
draft bill submitted by the Judicial Conference" to implement
the request.
5
I too believe that Congress should move speedily to enact
the Judicial Conference recommendations into law. There are
two reasons for this conclusion. First, the process followed by
the Judicial Conference assures that a request will not be
submitted to Congress unless there is strong evidence of the
need for additional judgeships in a particular circuit. Second, my
own studies of the federal appellate courts leave no doubt in my
mind that additional judgeships are warranted. Indeed, the
Judicial Conference request may understate the need.
A. The Judicial Conference Process
As Judge Jacobs explained in his testimony at the House
hearing, the Judicial Conference does not request additional
appellate judgeships solely on the basis of any formula, nor is it
sufficient that a particular court of appeals believes that new
judgeships are needed. Rather, the Judicial Conference follows
an elaborate process involving multiple stages of review and a
variety of criteria both quantitative and non-quantitative. The
process is generally referred to as the "Biennial Survey of
Judgeship Needs."
3. One pending bill would implement the Judicial Conference recommendation for
seven additional judgeships for the Ninth Circuit. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization and Judgeship Act of 2003, H.R. 2723, 108th Cong. (2003) (summary
available at http://www.house.gov/simpson.hr2723.pdf) (accessed Oct. 20, 2003; copy on
file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
4. Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, & Intellectual Property, H.R. Jud. Comm., Federal
Judiciary: Is There a Need for Additional Federal Judges?: Hearing on March 2003
Recommendations of Judicial Council of the United States, 108th Cong. (June 24, 2003)
[hereinafter Judgeships Hearing].
5. Id. at 15 (statement of Judge Jacobs). The other witnesses at the hearing were
William Jenkins, Jr., representing the General Accounting Office, and the author of this
Essay.
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Judge Jacobs provided a concise summary of the Biennial
Survey process:
(1) Each court of appeals seeking an additional judgeship
submits a detailed justification to the Subcommittee on Judicial
Statistics.
(2) The Subcommittee reviews and evaluates the request
and prepares a preliminary recommendation.
(3) The preliminary recommendation is sent to the
requesting court for comment and to the appropriate circuit
judicial council for review.
(4) The response from the court and the recommendation of
the judicial council are reviewed by the Subcommittee in the
light of updated caseload data.
(5) The Subcommittee prepares recommendations for the
Committee on Judicial Resources.
(6) The Committee's recommendations are submitted to the
Judicial Conference for final approval and transmission to
Congress.6
A key element in the Biennial Survey is the statistical
standard of 500 adjusted filings per three-judge panel. The
adjustment reflected in this standard is twofold. First, reinstated
cases are subtracted from the total. Second and more important,
pro se appeals are counted as one-third of a case.7 Unless
adjusted filings total 500 or more per panel, the Judicial
Conference will not recommend new judgeships for a court. But
a high level of adjusted filings will not, by itself, support a
recommendation. As Judge Jacobs told the House
subcommittee, the standard is "the starting point in the process,
not an end point."8
I will have more to say about the Biennial Survey process
in Part III,9 but one point deserves mention here. In testimony
before another House Judiciary subcommittee in 2002, Judge
Jacobs reported that in the judgeship needs survey of 2000, the
6. Id. at 10. The description in the text is based on Judge Jacobs's written summary as
well as the body of his statement. The former is not included in the hearing record, but is
on file with the author. For the sake of readability I have omitted quotation marks, but most
of the language is drawn from Judge Jacobs's submissions.
7. For further discussion of the "discounting" of pro se appeals, see infra Part I(B).
8. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 10 (statement of Judge Jacobs).
9. See infra at 261-64.
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various federal courts requested a total of seventy-eight
additional judgeships (some permanent, others temporary). But
in the course of the various stages of review, "that number was
eventually reduced to the sixty-three initially recommended by
the Judicial Conference in July 2000." ' This means that almost
one out of five judgeships requested by the individual courts did
not make it through the review process to the request submitted
to Congress." This strikes me as strong evidence that the review
process is serious and rigorous.1
2
Further evidence can be found in the documentary material
that the Judicial Conference furnished to Congress in support of
its requests. 3 The detailed analysis of caseload trends, court
practices, and available judgepower instills confidence that the
recommendations are justified. For example, in explaining the
recommendation for seven additional judgeships for the Ninth
Circuit, the Judicial Conference acknowledged the extensive
contribution of the court's twenty-one senior judges, but pointed
out that the majority of these judges were "75 years of a Fe or
older, including seven that [were] at least 80 years old."' The
report thus made clear that the Ninth Circuit currently has more
judgepower than its authorized allocation might suggest-but
that this condition could not be expected to continue long into
the future. 1
5
10. Subcomm. on the Constitution, H.R. Jud. Comm., A Judiciary Diminished Is
Justice Denied: The Constitution, the Senate, and the Vacancy Crisis in the Federal
Judiciary: Hearing on Causes and Effects of Judicial Vacancy Crisis, 107th Cong. 103
(Oct. 10, 2002) (statement of Judge Jacobs) [hereinafter Vacancy Hearing].
11. Judge Jacobs did not give a breakdown of district court and court of appeals
requests.
12. In his testimony in 2003, Judge Jacobs presented a similar account of the review
procedure for the 2003 survey, but the effect of the process is harder to assess because of
intervening action by Congress to create some new district-court judgeships. See
Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 10 (statement of Judge Jacobs).
13. This material was not included in the record of the hearing held in June 2003. It is
on file with the author and with the House Judiciary Committee.
14. Jud. Conf. of the U.S., U.S. Courts of Appeals 2003 Biennial Judgeship Survey,
Preliminary Recommendations-Ninth Circuit 1-2 (2003).
15. The supplementary materials also noted that, as of 2002, five active judges of the
Ninth Circuit were eligible for senior status, and "one additional judge [would become]
eligible in each of the next four years." Id. at 2. The Judicial Conference should perhaps
have made explicit what is implicit in this account: There is no way of knowing whether
judges who are eligible for senior status will take advantage of the opportunity. At the time
of the House hearing, three active judges of the Ninth Circuit had been eligible to take
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B. Justifications for the Request and the GAO Study
In concluding that the Judicial Conference request for
eleven new appellate judgeships is fully warranted, I also rely on
my own research into the work of the federal courts of appeals.
No new judgeships have been created for any federal court of
appeals since 1990. During that time, federal appellate caseloads
have continued to grow. For example, from 1991 through 2002,
filings nationwide increased from 43,027 to 57,555. 6 In concrete
terms, this means that four appeals are being filed today for
every three that were filed when Congress last created new
judgeships. Federal appellate judges were not underworked
fifteen or twenty years ago, and it would seem almost self-
evident that caseload growth on this scale must require
additional judgepower.
Against this background, the General Accounting Office
(GAO), in a report published in May 2003, raised some
questions about the statistical methods used by the Judicial
Conference in formulating its requests for new appellate
judgeships.'7 The report focused on two aspects of the Judicial
Conference approach: the weight of one-third given to pro se
appeals and the use of 500 "adjusted filings" per three-judge
panel as the base standard.'"
With respect to the first point, it is true that the Judicial
Conference did not carry out empirical research to determine the
judge time required by pro se cases as distinguished from
counseled appeals. In an ideal world with no limit on resources,
senior status for four years or more. See Congressional Quarterly, 2002 Judicial Staff
Directory 1218, 1226, 1275 (Paul Wayne Walker, ed., 19th ed., CQ Press 2002) (showing
birthdates of Judges Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Tashima).
16. These figures are taken from the Annual Reports of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts. See Administrative Off. of the U.S. Cts., 2002 Annual Report of
the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts 73 tbl. B (U.S. Govt. Printing
Off. 2002); Administrative Off. of the U.S. Cts., 1992 Annual Report of the Director 130
tbl. B (U.S. Govt. Printing Off. 1992) [hereinafter [Year] Annual Report]. The 1992
Annual Report is used for the 1991 figure because in 1992 the Administrative Office began
the current practice of reporting federal judicial caseloads on the basis of the federal
government fiscal year, October I to September 30. See id. at 56.
17. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 29-54 (reprinting GAO report). The report was
prepared at the request of Chairman Lamar Smith of the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee.
18. See generally id.
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such an undertaking would no doubt be valuable. But in the real
world of limited resources, I do not think it is necessary. When
an appeal is filed by a lawyer on behalf of a client, professional
norms as well as ethical obligations generally assure that the
appeal will have sufficient merit to require more than a de
minimis amount of judge time. That assurance is lacking when
an appeal is filed by a litigant (generally a non-lawyer) acting
for himself. The three-to-one ratio applied by the Judicial
Conference strikes me as a reasonable (if unscientific) effort to
quantify the difference.
Moreover, we do have some empirical data about the
relative demands on judge time of pro se and counseled cases. A
few years ago, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the research
arm of the federal judiciary, carried out a study of case
management practices for the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals (White
Commission).' 9 In contrast to the statistical tables issued by the
Administrative Office of United States Courts (AO), the FJC did
offer some detailed breakdowns of pro se and counseled cases.
Two are of particular interest in the context of case weighting.
One of the most time-consuming responsibilities of an
appellate judge is writing an opinion for publication. ° The
Federal Judicial Center study indicates that in 1998, only four
percent of pro se appeals received a published opinion, while
thirty-eight percent of counseled cases did so.2" Interestingly, the
percentage for pro se appeals varied widely among the circuits.
One circuit, the Fourth, appears to have a policy of not
publishing opinions in pro se cases.22 At the other end of the
spectrum, two circuits (the D.C. and Seventh Circuits) published
opinions in nine percent of pro se cases."
Another useful proxy for judge time is oral argument. The
FJC study tells us that fifty-seven percent of the counseled
appeals received oral argument in 1998, while only six percent
19. Judith A. McKenna, Laural L. Hooper & Mary Clark, Case Management
Procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 2000) [hereinafter FJC Study].
20. See infra Part I(C) at 250-5 1.
21. Id. at 19tbl. 11.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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of the pro se cases were argued orally.24 Here too there was wide
variation among the circuits, with one circuit-the Second-
allowing oral argument in almost one-third of its pro se cases."
Based on this information, the weight of one-third for pro
se appeals certainly seems justified. Indeed, one might argue
that pro se appeals should be discounted even more. However,
for several reasons, I do not suggest this step. First, as already
noted, the circuits vary greatly in their treatment of pro se cases.
It would not be desirable to penalize circuits that are more
generous in allocating time to pro se appeals. Second, further
discounting of pro se appeals might become a self-fulfilling
prophecy, leading judges (even unconsciously) to pass too
hurriedly over some appeals that after further study would be
seen to have merit." Finally, appearances matter. The judiciary
should take care not to give the impression that one class of
litigants is being accorded second-class status. (Even the current
weighting may have that effect, but the very fact that the
available data would justify heavier discounting gives some
legitimacy to the practice.)
The second focus of the GAO study is the baseline figure
of 500 adjusted filings per three-judge panel. In response, Judge
Jacobs pointed out that "all of the requests for additional circuit
judgeships are for courts in which adjusted filings per panel are
583 and higher."27 Thus, the workloads of the four courts
"transcend any deviations that superior fine-tuning could
correct."
I agree with Judge Jacobs's observation, but I am not
certain that it fully addresses the concern expressed by the GAO
report. The GAO appears to be saying, not simply that the
standard could be made more precise, but that "there is no
empirical basis for assessing" whether the standard is accurate
24. Id. at II tbl. 6 The report does not give the figure for pro se appeals, but it can be
calculated from the data that are included. I have attempted to replicate the FJC study using
the Federal Judicial Center's Integrated Database. See id. at 3 n. 4.
25. The Second Circuit's policy is routinely to allow oral argument in all cases,
including all pro se cases, unless the pro se litigant is incarcerated. See id. at 70.
26. This is. admittedly speculative, and the phenomenon is perhaps more likely to be
reflected in institutional arrangements than in individual judges' handling of particular
cases. In any event, the other concerns discussed in the text are more than sufficient to
suggest caution about further discounting of pro se appeals.
27. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 49 (Letter of Judge Jacobs to GAO).
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at all. In other words, the GAO seems to be asking: Why 500
adjusted filings per three-judge panel? Why not 400? Why not
600?
The GAO itself offers part of the answer:
At the time the current measure was developed and
approved, using the new benchmark of 500 adjusted case
filings resulted in judgeship numbers that closely
approximated the judgeship needs of the majority of the
courts of appeals, as the judges of each court perceived
them. The current court of appeals case-related workload
measure principally reflects a policy decision using
historical data on filings and terminations.
Perhaps more to the point, the benchmark resulted in judgeship
numbers that approximated either actual allocations or actual
allocations plus a modest increase for most of the circuits.
In my view, the use of a historically based approach is quite
defensible. Traditionally, Congress has been reluctant to expand
the Article III judiciary any more than necessary. No new
appellate judgeships have been created for more than a decade.
Under these circumstances, it would make little sense for the
Judicial Conference to come up with requests that deviated
sharply from existing allocations. For example, if the Judicial
Conference were to assert that one or more circuits should have
double the number of judgeships they now have, its request
would be met with incredulity. 29 At the same time, in view of the
substantial increase in volume of appeals over the last two
decades, it would be equally incredible to say that the regional
circuits are overstaffed.
The historical approach may be troublesome in one respect:
It takes as a given the procedural shortcuts that the courts of
appeals have adopted since caseloads began to grow at a
prodigious rate in the late 1960s. Professors William Reynolds
and William Richman have argued that these changes in the
28. Id. at 38 (GAO Report).
29. This is not to say that the idea is out of bounds. Some respected academics and
judges have called for a "radical expansion of the circuit bench." William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1290, 1307
(1996); Stephen Reinhardt, Developing the Mission: Another View, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 877,
880 (1995). Moreover, if a court forgoes judgeship requests during an extended period of
caseload growth, the accumulated needs may indeed justify a substantial increase in the
size of the court. See infra Part 11, at 253.
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appellate process have transformed the federal courts of appeals
"into certiorari courts dispensing justice unequally." 30 While I
believe that this argument is greatly overstated,3 there can be no
doubt that judges today are deciding cases at a rate that would
have been unthinkable thirty or forty years ago.32 By taking 500
adjusted filings per panel as the baseline, the Judicial
Conference effectively cuts off any possibility of even partially
returning to the norms of an earlier era. I think this is regrettable,
but, as already indicated, I see no realistic possibility that
Congress would endorse a substantial expansion in the federal
appellate bench.
C. Assessing the Appellate Baseline
In supporting the request for additional appellate
judgeships, I do not rely on the historical approach alone.
Although the available data are not as complete or detailed as
one would like, they do allow us to get a good sense of what the
Judicial Conference standard means in practice. Viewing the
standard in this way, I am confident that the Judicial Conference
has indeed taken a conservative approach in assessing court
requests for new positions.
As it happens, the circuit whose workload most closely
approximates the Judicial Conference's starting point is my
own, the Third. In 2002, the Third Circuit's adjusted filings
were 529 per panel-about five percent more than the level that
would allow consideration of a request for new judgeships.33 (In
fact, the Judicial Conference has not recommended any
additional judgeships for the Third Circuit. It will remain a court
of fourteen active judges.)
The 2002 Judicial Caseload Profile shows that the court's
adjusted filings of somewhat more than 500 per panel translated
30. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 273, 277 (1996).
31. For a partial response, see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of
the Appeals Courts, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1264 (1996).
32. See e.g. Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial
Administration, 42 Tex. L. Rev. 949, 957-62 (1964).
33. This figure is based on my own calculation, using the Judicial Conference formula.
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into 381 terminations on the merits per active judge.34
"Terminations on the merits" comprise the cases actually
decided by the judges after oral argument or submission on the
briefs. The figure thus excludes procedural terminations that
require no judicial action. Further, this particular statistic does
not count participations by senior judges and visiting judges. It
is thus a useful starting point for considering what the baseline
means as a measure of the day-to-day responsibilities of the
judges in regular active service.
We know from other AO data that the Third Circuit issues
a published (i.e., precedential) decision in about sixteen percent
of its merits decisions.35 (Here and elsewhere in this analysis,
numbers have been rounded.) This means that each active judge
participates in about sixty cases that are decided by a published
opinion. Most cases, of course, are heard and considered by
three-judge panels, with one judge writing the opinion for the
court. If we assume that the active judges participate in a
roughly equal basis in the court's work, we can calculate that
each active judge would be responsible for authoring twenty
opinions and reviewing forty opinions written by other judges.
In fact, a series of Westlaw searches yields almost precisely
those numbers--on the average, twenty authored opinions and
sixty-four participations per judge in "reported" cases.3 6
What about the other eighty-four percent of the decisions?
The court distinguishes between counseled and pro se appeals.
Starting on January 1, 2002, non-precedential opinions in
counseled cases have been posted on the court's web site and
made available to Westlaw and LEXIS. Westlaw searches
indicate that in the course of that first year under the new
procedure, each active judge participated in an average of 150
counseled cases that yielded a written non-precedential
decision.37
34. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management
Statistics: Judicial Caseload Profile 2002 (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 2002) (showing
Courts of Appeals data) (available at http:www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2002.pl)
(accessed Oct. 21, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
35. 2002 Annual Report, supra n. 16, at tbl. S-3.
36. For this search, I used the CTA3R database and the queries "ju(Alito), "pa(Alito),"
"ju(Becker)," "pa(Becker)," etc.
37. For this search, I used similar queries in the "CTA3U" database.
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Finally, there are the unpublished decisions in pro se
appeals. It appears that in the course of a year an active judge
will participate in the adjudication of 170 such cases.38 The AO
describes these as "reasoned" dispositions, which are defined as
"opinions and orders that expound on the law as applied to the
facts of each case and that detail the judicial reasons upon which
the judgment is based."3 9 Only a handful of the Third Circuit's
dispositions on the merits are issued "without comment."
40
With this information, we can begin to measure the
individual judges' labors that correspond to the Judicial
Conference benchmark of 500 adjusted filings per panel. To do
this, we must first take account of the judges' obligations other
than the disposition of argued and submitted cases. These
include committee work, Judicial Conference activities,
motions, and petitions for rehearing. Let us assume that each
judge spends the equivalent of three weeks each year on these
activities. (That is probably a conservative estimate.) Each judge
will also sit on an oral argument calendar during seven weeks of
the year; those weeks will be largely unavailable for other
judicial activities. Finally, let us assume that each judge will
take two weeks of vacation. This leaves no more than forty
weeks for work on argued and submitted cases. 4' For purposes of
analysis, it is helpful to divide these forty weeks into twenty
two-week periods.
In each two-week period, the judge must complete a
substantial opinion "for publication." At a recent congressional
hearing, Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit described the
intense, in-depth work that goes into the writing of a published
opinion:
38. This figure was calculated as follows. From the 381 terminations per active judge I
subtracted first the sixty cases with a published opinion, then the 150 counseled cases with
an unpublished opinion.
39. See e.g. 2002 Annual Report, supra n. 16, at tbl. S-3.
40. See id.
41. In fact, the judges probably have considerably less than forty weeks to work on
argued and submitted cases; they must also prepare for their argument calendars. Judge
William Bryson of the Federal Circuit recently estimated that he spends a week to a week
and a half reading briefs in preparation for each week of sitting. Twenty Questions for
Circuit Judge William Curtis Bryson of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
How Appealing's 20 Questions (available at http://20q-appellateblog.blogspot.com)
(interview posted Sept. 2, 2003; Question 5) (accessed Oct. 21, 2003; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
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A published opinion must set forth the facts in sufficient
detail so lawyers and judges unfamiliar with the case can
understand the question presented. At the same time, it
must omit irrelevant facts that could form a spurious
ground for distinguishing the opinion. The legal discussion
must be focused enough to dispose of the case at hand, yet
broad enough to provide useful guidance in future cases.
Because we normally write opinions where the law is
unclear, we must explain why we are adopting one rule
while rejecting others. We must also make sure that the
new rule does not conflict with precedent, or sweep beyond
the questions fairly presented.
While some opinions will require only a few days' work, others
will require much more than that. And because the court
publishes an opinion in only one-sixth of its cases, there is no
chaff-no routine affirmances to bring down the average.
In the course of the two-week period, the judge must also
give close attention to two other precedential cases in which
another panel member is writing the opinion. Even without the
burden of authorship, the responsibilities are substantial. Each
participating judge must examine the relevant materials, both
legal (precedents, legislative history, scholarly commentary, and
the like) and factual (particularly the record of the proceedings
in the lower court). Each judge must think carefully about the
issues and their implications for future cases. And each judge
must do his or her best to assure that the opinion articulates the
holding and the rationale in a way that lawyers and other judges
can understand and apply.
Finally, the judge must also participate in about sixteen
cases that will not become precedential. In these cases, the judge
need not worry about the precise phrasing of the opinion or the
implications of the ruling for the future development of the law.
But we would certainly want the judge to study the law and the
record in sufficient depth to be confident that the outcome is
correct and that the panel has not overlooked prejudicial error or
unfairness in the court below.
42. Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, & Intellectual Property, H.R. Jud. Comm.,
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing on Limited Publication and Noncitation of
Opinions, 107th Cong. 12 (June 27, 2002) (statement of Judge Kozinski).
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The numbers in this analysis are not precise. But they are
solid enough to justify the conclusion that the Judicial
Conference baseline of 500 adjusted filings per panel is at least
reasonable. Indeed, if anything, it may err on the side of
underestimating judgeship needs. According to the Federal
Judicial Center study, the Third Circuit is one of only three
circuits that hear oral argument in less than half of the counseled
appeals. 43 And the Third Circuit is second lowest in' the
percentage of counseled cases that are decided by published
opinion. To the extent that these percentages reflect the
pressure of caseloads, one might argue that the addition of one
or two judges would enable the court to better serve the legal
community of the circuit.
D. A Better Approach
In his response to the GAO report, Judge Jacobs asserted
that the standard of 500 adjusted filings "has served the
judiciary's needs for developing the baseline for considering
requests for additional appellate judgeships., 45 For the reasons I
have given, I agree that fine-tuning the measures of workload
used by the Judicial Conference is not likely to assist Congress
in determining whether to create new Article III judgeships. At
the same time, I think that the system does not serve Congress as
well as it could. What is needed is not greater precision in the
statistics, but rather a wider range of non-quantitative
information, including the views of lawyers and other citizens.
In Part III of this Essay I offer some suggestions for
opening up the process used by the Judicial Conference in
formulating its judgeship recommendations. A more open
process, I believe, will provide significant benefits to the
judiciary as well as to Congress. Before presenting those
suggestions, however, I will discuss developments in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits-developments that point up the need for
rethinking the Judicial Conference's current approach.
43. FJC Study, supra n. 19, at II (tbl. 6).
44. Id. at 19 (tbl. 11).
45. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 50 (letter from Judge Jacobs to GAO).
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II. THE MISSING CIRCUITS
To anyone who follows the work of the federal courts of
appeals, the most striking aspect of the Judicial Conference
request is something that is not there-a recommendation for
new judgeships for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. In all four
courts of appeals on the Judicial Conference list, as Judge
Jacobs pointed out, adjusted filings are well above the minimum
of 500. The figures range from a low of 583 (in the Sixth
Circuit) to a high of 870 (in the Ninth Circuit).46 But if we look
at the Fifth Circuit, we find that adjusted filings in 2002 were
just short of 1000--double the baseline for consideration of a
judgeship request. And in the Eleventh Circuit, adjusted filings
totaled an astounding 1112 per panel.47
To put these figures in context, the most conservative of the
Judicial Conference appellate recommendations is the request
for the Second Circuit. With two additional judges, and
assuming no increase in the volume of appeals, the Second
Circuit's adjusted filings would drop to 614 per panel.48 Under
that standard, the Fifth Circuit would be entitled to as many as
twenty-eight judgeships rather than the seventeen it has now.
Under that same standard, the Eleventh Circuit could grow from
twelve active judges to twenty-two, almost doubling its size.49
Yet the Judicial Conference did not recommend a single
additional judgeship for either court.
The absence of a request for the Eleventh Circuit is
particularly remarkable. The Eleventh Circuit was created in
46. The figures are given in the chart attached to the press release issued by the
Administrative Office on March 18, 2003, announcing the Judicial Conference judgeship
request. See News Release, supra n. 1.
47. These figures represent my own calculations, based on the Judicial Conference
formula.
48. This is the figure given in the detailed justification material that the Administrative
Office provided to each member of the Judiciary Committee. See supra n. 13.
49. Adjusted filings in the Fifth Circuit in 2002 were 5,643. The figure for the Eleventh
Circuit was 4,448. (Again, these are my own calculations.) In an interview in 2003, Judge
Stanley F. Birch, Jr., of the Eleventh Circuit stated: "Given our caseload the
Administrative Office of the [United States] Courts has suggested that we could request an
additional 12-14 judges based on its workload statistics." See Twenty Questions for Circuit
Judge Stanley F. Birch, Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, How
Appealing's 20 Questions (available at http://20q-appellateblog.blogspot.com) (interview
posted Oct. 7, 2003; Question 12) (accessed Oct. 21, 2003; copy on file with Journal of
Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter Birch Interview].
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1981 when Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit into two
new circuits.50 At that time the Eleventh Circuit was a court of
twelve judges and 2,556 filings. Today, the Eleventh Circuit is
still a court of twelve judges. But filings are now 7,472-almost
three times what they were when the court was established. Yet
the Eleventh Circuit is not even mentioned in the Judicial
Conference submission.
The explanation for this apparent anomaly lies in an
important aspect of the Judicial Conference process that I have
not yet mentioned. The Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics-the
body that initiates the Biennial Survey-will not recommend
any additional judgeships for a court of appeals unless a
majority of the active judges of the court submit a request. If
additional judgeships appear to be justified by workload
statistics but no judgeships are requested, the court is required to
explain its position, but as far as I am aware, that explanation is
final and is not subject to review by any entity within the
Judicial Conference. Further, it appears that one recognized
explanation is that the court is opposed to adding judges
notwithstanding its increased workload.
For more than a decade, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits
have taken the position that they want to remain "small," or
perhaps more accurately that they do not want to become larger
than they already are." Under the existing Judicial Conference
system, that determination stands as an absolute bar to any
recommendation by the Judicial Conference for new judgeships,
no matter how strongly the Judicial Conference's own standard
might suggest that at least some new positions are needed.
The judges of these two circuits have offered several
reasons why they resist expanding the size of their courts.
Primary among these is the concern that adding judges will lead
50. See Arthur D. Hellman, Deciding Who Decides: Understanding the Realities of
Judicial Reform, 15 L. & Soc. Inquiry 343 (1990). For a more detailed account, see
Deborah J. Barrow & Thomas G. Walker, A Court Divided: The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Politics of Judicial Reform (Yale U. Press 1988).
51. In the early 1990s the Fifth Circuit requested one additional judgeship. See e.g.
Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 57 (Sept. 12,
1990). The request was later dropped. In 2002, the chief judge of the Eleventh Circuit
stated without elaboration: "Although the Court leads the nation in number of cases per
judge in most categories, twelve judges are enough." Vacancy Hearing, supra n. 10, at 90
(letter of Chief Judge J.L. Edmondson).
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to a decline in the "coherence and uniformity of the law." 52 A
leading proponent of this view is the former chief judge of the
Eleventh Circuit, Gerald B. Tjoflat. Judge Tjoflat believes that
as a court grows larger, "the clarity and stability of the circuit's
law suffers."53 That, in turn, "increases litigiousness and
complicates the disposition of cases." 
5 4
For two reasons, I am skeptical about this line of argument.
First, over the last decade and a half, I have carried out extensive
empirical research on the largest of the federal appellate courts,
the Ninth Circuit. This research does not support the claim that
the Ninth Circuit has been unable to maintain consistency in its
decisions." Nor does it validate the criticisms of the Ninth
Circuit's "limited en banc court," unique among the federal
courts of appeals.56 I have also undertaken a comparative study
to test the hypothesis that "unpredictability attributable to
disarray in circuit law is more prevalent in the Ninth Circuit than
in other circuits.""5 Once again, the data do not support the
hypothesis.58 Overall, this research "seriously undermines-if it
does not indeed topple-one of the principal pillars of the
argument that adding to the number of judges on an appellate
court inevitably brings instability and incoherence in panel
decisions." 59
52. Gerald B. Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79 ABA J. 70, 71 (July 1993)
(quoting Judge Irving Kaufman).
53. Id. at 70.
54. Id. at 71. In his How Appealing interview, Judge Birch of the Eleventh Circuit said:
[A]dditional judges would hinder our efficient operation rather than help it.
Given our caseload the Administrative Office of the Courts has suggested that
we could request an additional 12-14 judges based on its workload statistics. As
a court we have almost unanimously rejected adding even a single more judge.
A collegial court operates most efficiently and effectively by remaining as small
as possible.
Judge Birch then cited the article by Judge Tjoflat quoted above. See Birch Interview,
supra n. 49 (Question 12).
55. For a summary of the research, with citations to detailed reports, see Arthur D.
Hellman, Dividing the Ninth Circuit. An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come, 57 Mont. L.
Rev. 261, 274-80 (1996).
56. See Arthur D. Hellman, Getting It Right: Panel Error and the En Bane Process in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 425, 452-66 (2000) [hereinafter
Hellman, Getting It Right].
57. Arthur D. Hellman, Precedent, Predictability, and Federal Appellate Structure, 60
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1029, 1090 (1999).
58. Id. at 1088-1100.
59. Id. at 1100.
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Yet even if these studies are not persuasive, I believe that
the judges' position is problematic for a more fundamental
reason. The judges' concern is focused on what has been called
"the law-declaring function of appellate courts." 6 0 That function
is certainly important; indeed, I have devoted much of my
academic career to studying it. Nevertheless, that function is
secondary. The primary function of the federal courts of appeals
is to do justice-and to be seen as doing justice-in the
individual cases and controversies that come before them.
Professor Paul Carrington made the point eloquently almost
thirty years ago:
Uniformity and even-handedness are important goals of any
legal system. Certainly, we should strive for stability and
resist erratic decision-making. But, I submit, this is not
nearly as important to the welfare of the republic as the
qualities of visibility and personal responsibility .... Even
a very excellent government can abide some
unevenness ... in the treatment of like cases. But a very
excellent government cannot abide indifference and
unconcern for the plight of individual litigants. We cannot
afford to treat citizens approaching the highest accessible
levels of our government as if they were customers at a
bargain counter shoe sale. If it is necessary in order to
assure visibility and personal responsibility of circuit
judges for individual outcomes, we can bear a lot of non-
uniformity. Hence, I begin by urging the Commission to
make this priority clear in its report. Let us be certain that
we have enough resources to provide a decently visible and
appropriately personal appellate process, and then address
the question of uniformity.
61
I fear that the judges of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, in
their zeal to protect the law-declaring function of their courts,
may not be giving sufficient attention to the effect of their policy
on the quality of appellate decisionmaking. As the Commission
on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals
(White Commission) recognized in its Final Report, there comes
a point at which the streamlining of procedures begins to
60. Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals, Final
Report 47 (1998) [hereinafter White Commission Report].
61. 2 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Hearings,
Second Phase 954-55 (1975 ) (statement of Prof. Paul D. Carrington).
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compromise "the appearance of legitimacy of the appellate
process [and] the quality of appellate justice."62 When individual
judges are deciding cases at the rate of 750 or more each year-
as is happening in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits-one must
wonder whether that point has been reached.63
I have no doubt that the judges of the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits believe that they are giving adequate attention to the
cases that come before them and that they have not
compromised any of the essential functions of an appellate
court. But I am not confident that judges can necessarily
recognize when they have gone too far in relying on procedural
shortcuts or when they have begun to delegate responsibilities
that they should be undertaking themselves. For example: Do
the judges too readily accept the drafts of precedential opinions
prepared by their law clerks? Do panel members sign on to the
authoring judge's opinion without carefully scrutinizing the
statements of law or the rationale? Do the second and third
judges on a screening panel defer too much to the judge who
initially reviewed the case? These are not lapses that occur
overnight. Change is gradual and incremental, as judges
imperceptibly find themselves adopting practices that they
would have rejected when caseload pressures were less exigent.
Is there any way of determining whether judges on a
particular court of appeals have gone too far in delegating the
performance of their Article III functions? I do not think we will
find any "smoking gun." But one possible indicator is the ratio
of central staff attorneys to active judges. On this point the
Federal Judicial Center report provides the most recent
information available.64 That report indicates that in most of the
circuits the ratio of staff attorneys to active judges is no more
than two to one. Only two circuits do not follow this pattern.
The Fifth Circuit, with seventeen authorized judgeships,
employs fifty-five staff attorneys at court headquarters in New
62. White Commission Report, supra n. 60, at 25.
63. The figures given in the Federal Court Management Statistics for 2002 are 758 for
the Fifth Circuit and 843 for the Eleventh Circuit. The Fifth Circuit's figure is almost
exactly double what it is in the Third Circuit. Federal Court Management Statistics:
Judicial Caseload Profile 2002, supra n. 34. For a discussion of what the Third Circuit
figure means in practice, see supra Part I(C).
64. FJC Study, supra n. 19, at 6, 107, 189.
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Orleans. The Eleventh Circuit, with twelve authorized
judgeships, employs a total of forty-one staff attorneys. The
ratio of staff attorneys to judgeships in both circuits is thus more
than three to one.
It would be wrong to jump to conclusions based on this one
set of data, but there is more. First, I assume that the judges have
their full complement of "elbow clerks"; currently, each active
judge may hire four clerks to work in his or her chambers.65
Thus, the twelve active judges of the Eleventh Circuit are
supervising, directly or indirectly, a corps of almost ninety law
clerks and staff attorneys. Second, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits rank among the lowest in the percentage of counseled
66
cases that receive oral argument.
In his statement at the House hearing, Judge Jacobs offered
one explanation of why the Conference was not requesting
additional judgeships for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. He
said:
The case mix in the circuits where the Conference is
recommending additional judgeships differs significantly
from the courts that did not request additional judgeships.
For example, criminal and prisoner petition appeals were
approximately 60 percent of all appeals filed in the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits (which did not seek additional
judgeships), but only about 35 percent in the Second and
Ninth Circuits (which did).67
This explanation is not persuasive. In suggesting that the
"case mix" is significantly different in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, Judge Jacobs points to only two categories of cases,
one of which consists of prisoner petitions. But more than ninety
percent of the prisoner petitions in both circuits were filed by
prisoners acting pro se. Pro se appeals are already discounted
65. Under Judicial Conference rules, an active judge may have four law clerks and one
secretary or three law clerks and two secretaries. Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, The Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures vol. 3, § D, ch. 1, pt. A, ex. A-I
(Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. 1999) (revised Jan. 15, 2003). I am assuming that with
modern word processing, most judges opt to have four law clerks.
66. See FJC Study, supra n. 19, at II (tbl. 6). The Fifth Circuit does hold oral argument
in more than half of its counseled cases. Id.
67. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at I I (statement of Judge Jacobs).
68. The Fifth Circuit had 3,227 prisoner cases in 2002; of these, 3,000 were filed pro
se. For the Eleventh Circuit, the figure was 2,561 out of 2,763. The data are given in Table
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in the figures on adjusted filings. As for criminal cases, I would
not assume a priori that counseled criminal appeals require less
judge time than counseled appeals in civil matters. Finally, even
if there are some differences in the case mix, it is hard to see
how they could account for the enormous disparity in the
recommended complement of judges.
Having said that, I recognize that there may be
circumstances, not reflected in case management data, that make
the volume of appeals more manageable in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits than an equivalent volume would be elsewhere
in the nation. Perhaps the docket is more homogenous in subject
matter, so that the judges encounter a higher proportion of cases
with familiar issues than do their counterparts in other circuits.
Perhaps there is less disagreement among the judges, so that
panel members need spend little time in writing dissents,
negotiating the language of majority opinions, or exchanging
69
memos on whether to rehear cases en banc.
These hypotheses are appropriate subjects for research. But
even if these circumstances exist, I must admit to some doubts
that they would adequately explain the extremely high per-judge
disposition rate in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. Further, some
members of the two courts have voiced concerns similar to those
I have expressed. In 1992, Judge (now Chief Judge) Carolyn
Dineen King of the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "the sheer
volume [of cases] has had an adverse impact on the number of
decisions that we can fairly claim have been fully considered
and understood."7 ° In 1997, then-Chief Judge Joseph W.
Hatchett of the Eleventh Circuit described in detail the
consequences of the procedures adopted by his court and
B-9 of the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
(available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/bO9sepO2.pdf) (accessed on
Oct. 21, 2003; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
69. Judge Jacobs alluded to this point. After commenting that "there are very big
differences between circuit courts," he observed that "because we sit on panels, it matters
if [a court] is ideologically divided. It matters if the judges get along with each other."
Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 68 (testimony of Judge Jacobs).
70. Carolyn Dineen King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 955, 958 (1991).
(Although the article has a publication date of 1991, it is based on a speech delivered in
1992.)
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concluded that "litigants of this circuit would be better served if
this court had [two or three more] active judges." 71
Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that Congress should
take immediate action to create additional judgeships for these
courts. What I do suggest is that the issue should be the subject
of public discussion. The Biennial Survey of Judgeship Needs
conducted by the Judicial Conference provides a perfect
opportunity-or rather, it would provide that opportunity if 'the
process were more open.
III. PROCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY
The omission of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits from the
Judicial Conference judgeship request is troubling in itself.
What makes it even more problematic, in my view, are issues of
process and accountability. After explaining why this is so, I
will offer suggestions for revising the process not only in those
circuits but throughout the federal judicial system.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have opted, quite self-
consciously, to deal with caseload growth by accepting ever-
increasing workloads for individual judges and by cutting back
on the traditional elements of the appellate process. That is as
much a policy choice as deciding whether to divide the Ninth
Circuit. As Judge King has written, "[W]hen Congress
acquiesces in a decision by a court not to add judges and when,
by any normal measures, more judges are needed, Congress is
itself making a decision as to the kind of justice that the court
will dispense." 72
The issue of whether to divide the Ninth Circuit has been
the subject of public debate in many forums. Law review
articles, news stories, and op-ed pieces have focused on every
aspect of the Ninth Circuit's work. The White Commission
devoted almost all of its attention to the question of whether the
Ninth Circuit or its court of appeals should be reorganized into
two or more separate units. In contrast, the counterpart issues in
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits remain invisible. The policy
71. Joseph W. Hatchett, Chief Judge, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the. 11th Cir., Speech,
State of the Circuit 11 (1997) (copy of transcript on file with author).
72. King, supra n. 70, at 962.
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decision by those courts to remain "small" has occasioned
virtually no public discussion and almost certainly is unknown
to the vast majority of lawyers and other interested citizens in
the regions they serve.
I recognize that the high profile of the Ninth Circuit results
to some degree from controversies that have nothing to do with
judicial administration. But I also believe that the absence of
debate about the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits can be attributed in
part to the process followed by the Judicial Conference in
formulating the judgeship requests that it submits to Congress.
There are two aspects of the process that are problematic in
isolation; they are even more so when one considers their
combined effect.
First, the process takes place entirely within the confines of
the judiciary. For example, the request for two additional
judgeships for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals was
considered by the members of that court, by the Judicial Council
of the Second Circuit (a body that is composed only of judges),
and by the Judicial Conference and its committees. No one else
had an opportunity to express views, to question assumptions, or
to seek additional justifications or explanations for the
conclusions reached at the various stages of the process. Until
the Judicial Conference issued its press release on March 18,
2003, only a handful of people outside the judiciary knew that a
recommendation was being considered. Even then, no details
were forthcoming. Although the Judicial Conference supported
its recommendation with a cogent, in-depth analysis, almost no
one has seen that documentation.73
Second, under the current system, if a majority of the active
judges of a circuit prefer to keep their court "small," that
determination stands as an absolute barrier to any consideration
of the possible need for new judgeships for that court. This
"triggerlock" manifests itself in several ways. If a court, in
response to the initial query from the Judicial Conference's
Statistics Subcommittee, requests no additional judgeships, the
trail of documentation ceases. Not only is there no public
discussion, there is no discussion even within the Judicial
Conference and its committees. The impressive compilation of
73. See n. 13, supra.
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data and analysis that accompanies a recommendation for new
judgeships has no counterpart in the case of circuits that do not
seek new judgeships, whether or not the Judicial Conference
standard suggests that new judgeships are warranted.
A particularly unfortunate aspect of the current system is
that if a majority of the judges on a court do not initiate a request
for additional judgeships, Congress has no opportunity to hear
from members of the court who take a different view. For
example, Judge King of the Fifth Circuit made clear in 1992 that
she thought her court needed additional judges.7 4 Since that time,
adjusted filings in the Fifth Circuit have increased more than
twelve percent.75 Recent comments indicate that Judge King
continues to believe that additional judgeships are needed for
her court." But there is no hint of that view in the materials that
the Judicial Conference submitted to Congress.
The process concerns I have identified are not limited to the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. For more than twenty-five years,
Congress has been considering proposals to divide the Ninth
Circuit and create a new Twelfth Circuit. In 1995, the Senate
Judiciary Committee reported out one such bill.77 In 1998, the
White Commission urged Congress to divide the Ninth Circuit
into three semi-autonomous "adjudicative divisions" that would
''capitalize on the benefits of smaller decisional units."" But as
far as one can tell from published materials, the Biennial Survey
proceeded as though these proposals did not exist. The Judicial
Conference simply recommended seven new appellate
74. See King, supra n. 70, at 962.
75. It is not possible to use the current formula to calculate adjusted filings before 1993
because that is the first year in which the Administrative Office published data on pro se
appeals. From 1993 to 2002, adjusted filings in the Fifth Circuit increased twelve percent.
(Author's calculation.)
76. Judge King now chairs the Judicial Conference's executive committee. In March
2003, she offered some telling comments in support of the Conference's recommendations
for additional appellate judgeships. She noted that circuit judges must often write 225 to
250 opinions a year; they must also sign on to another 450 opinions authored by other
panel members. The judges can carry such a workload, Judge King said, only by "heavy
reliance on staff and by writing shorter opinions, often a one-line opinion saying
'affirmed."' Under those circumstances, she added, holding judges accountable is difficult.
See David F. Pike, Judicial Conference Requests Help for Busy Bench Officers, L.A. Daily
J. I (Mar. 19, 2003). The figures cited by Judge King suggest that she was referring to her
own court.
77. S. Rep. 104-197 (Dec. 21, 1995).
78. White Commission Report, supra n. 60, at 47.
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judgeships for the Ninth Circuit. The documentation submitted
by the Conference in support of the request makes no mention of
the possibility of restructuring the circuit or the court of appeals.
If the process had been more open, this issue would not
have gone unnoticed. Proponents of reorganization would have
called attention to the White Commission's conclusion that "the
law declaring function of appellate courts requires groups of
judges smaller than the present Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals."7 9 They would have asked: If the present court, with
twenty-eight authorized judgeships, is too large, does it make
sense to add seven new judgeships, creating a court of thirty-five
active judges? Or would it be preferable to take the occasion to
divide the circuit? If so, how should the circuit be split?
Opponents of circuit division would have responded by
explaining the flaws in the White Commission's diagnosis. °
By an accident of timing, a hearing was held by a House
Judiciary subcommittee on one circuit-reorganization proposal
in July 2002, during the early stages of the Biennial Survey. The
Ninth Circuit's Chief Judge, Mary M. Schroeder, told the
Subcommittee that the court's "greatest need" was for
"additional judgeships." 8' But there was no discussion by
witnesses or Subcommittee members of the judgeship request
that was then being considered by the Judicial Conference's
Statistics Subcommittee.82 Congress thus lost an opportunity to
consider the full range of options for dealing with caseload
growth in the western states.
At the other end of the spectrum, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has twelve authorized
79. Id.
80. For detailed exposition of the flaws, see general.y Hellman, Getting It Right, supra
n. 56; Arthur D. Hellman, The Unkindest Cut: The White Commission Proposal to
Restructure the Ninth Circuit, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 377 (2000); and Procter Hug, Jr., The
Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals' Final Report:
An Analysis of the Commission's Recommendations for the Ninth Circuit, 32 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 887 (1999). For a response to criticisms of the White Commission proposal, see
Pamela A. Rymer, How Big Is Too Big? 15 J. L. & Politics 383 (1999).
81. Subcomm. on Cts., the Internet, & Intellectual Property, H.R. Jud. Comm., Hearing
on H.R. 1203: Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 2001 at 10 (July 23,
2002) (statement of Judge Schroeder).
82. I do not fault Judge Schroeder or any of the other participants in the hearing for not
discussing the request. In July 2002, no information about the pending Biennial Survey had
been made public.
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judgeships-more than twice the number it would be entitled to
under the adjusted filings standard. The Judicial Conference has
developed a process "for reviewing situations where it may be
appropriate to recommend elimination of a... [court of appeals]
judgeship or that a vacancy not be filled," " and a few years ago,
the Statistics Subcommittee asked the Federal Judicial Center to
study the D.C. Circuit's caseload. The study concluded that,
because of administrative agency appeals that are unique to the
D.C. Circuit, the need for additional judgeships should not be
measured by the standard applied to other circuits. 4 But nothing
in the material submitted by the Judicial Conference to Congress
indicates whether it considered the possibility of recommending
a downsizing of the D.C. Circuit.' Here, too, Congress would
benefit from hearing the full range of views that a public debate
would generate.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Each circuit presents a different set of circumstances. But
whatever the issues that might be the subject of controversy, I
believe that a more open process for the Biennial Survey would
provide more of the information that Congress should have in
order to carry out its responsibility for overseeing the
administration of justice in the federal courts. A more open
process would also aid the judiciary in achieving its policy
objectives.
I offer two principal suggestions. First, the process should
be made more public, with an opportunity for participation by
interested members of the legal community. Second, a negative
response by a majority of active judges on a court of appeals to
83. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 18 (statement of Judge Jacobs). The quoted
language refers to district courts, but Judge Jacobs explained that a similar process has
been developed for the courts of appeals. Id.
84. This summary is based on the description in the GAO Report. See Judgeships
Hearing, supra n. 4, at 38-39 (GAO Report). The study has not been published, and it is
not listed in the FJC's current catalog of publications.
85. At the House hearing, in response to a question, Judge Jacobs briefly referred to the
"special and unusual case mix" of the D.C. Circuit. Judgeships Hearing, supra n. 4, at 68
(testimony of Judge Jacobs). In November 2003, Senators Charles Grassley and Jeff
Sessions introduced a bill to eliminate one of the judgeships on the circuit. See S. 1921,
108th Cong. (2003).
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the initial query from the Subcommittee on Statistics should not
stand as an absolute barrier to consideration of new judgeships
for court.
What follows is a sketch of how a revised process might
work. The description refers to the formulation of judgeship
requests for the courts of appeals. However, the proposal could
be modified for use at the district court level also.
A. Provisional Response
The process would begin, as it does today, with a request
from the Subcommittee on Statistics asking individual courts to
evaluate their need for additional judgeships or for the filling of
vacancies. Each court would prepare its response, as is done
now. However, instead of sending a final response to the
Subcommittee, the court would prepare a draft response. The
draft would be posted on the court's website along with an
announcement inviting comments from bar associations and
interested citizens.
B. Explanatory Material
To supplement its draft response, the court would post or
link to material that would help outsiders to assess the court's
provisional conclusions. This material would include
* a description of the Judicial Conference process,
including the numerical standard and other criteria used in
evaluating court requests;
* information about the workload and case management
practices of the particular circuit;
9 the comparative statistical profiles that are now made
available to the courts to help in formulating their requests;
and
* other comparative data that would give members of the
legal community a perspective on the practices of the
particular circuit.
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But most of the material would be explanatory. Thus, if the
court is requesting additional judgeships, it would provide the
justification, including the anticipated consequences for the
judiciary and for litigants if the request is not met. In the
unlikely event that the court's request is not supported by the
standard of 500 adjusted filings, the court would explain why
the standard is inapplicable.
Especially if a circuit is requesting two or more additional
positions, it would be useful for the court to explain how it
would use the additional judgepower. For example, would the
court allow oral argument in a larger proportion of its cases?
Would it dispose of more cases with precedential opinions, or
write at greater length in "unpublished" dispositions? Or would
the court concentrate on reducing the time between the filing of
an appeal and the disposition of the case?
If the court's workload statistics appear to justify an
increase in the number of judgeships, but the court is not
requesting any new positions, the court would set out the factors
that influenced its decision. For example, are the contributions
of senior or visiting judges so extensive as to offset the
excessive workload? Do statistics overstate the true burdens on
the judges because of the nature of the cases? Or does the court
oppose any increase in size, irrespective of other considerations?
C. Inclusion of Competing Views
If the judges are divided in their views, both positions
should be reflected in the court's response. I would not insist
that the court identify the judges taking the competing positions,
or even that it give the numerical division. (My own preference
would be to provide that information, but I can understand why
judges might view this as personalizing the controversy-for
example, if the chief judge is a member of the minority within
the court.)
D. Opportunity to Comment
Interested persons and organizations would be given sixty
days, perhaps ninety or even 120, in which to submit their
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comments. Ideally, comments would be posted- on the court's
web site as they are received, so that others can agree or
disagree.
E. Later Stages
At the end of the comment period, the court would
reconsider its position in light of the comments and would
formulate a final version of its response. This final version
(including minority views within the court) would go to the
Statistics Subcommittee along with a summary of the comments
received. This material too would be posted on the court's web
site. Thereafter, the process would follow the course it does
today, with two important differences.
1. No "Triggerlock"
First, the absence of a request supported by a majority of
the active judges would not necessarily stand as an absolute
barrier to consideration of a possible recommendation for
additional judgeships. For example, if adjusted filings are well
above the standard, and a substantial minority within the court
believes that additional judgeships are needed, a
recommendation might be forthcoming. I doubt this would
happen often, but it is at least possible that the minority's
arguments will be more persuasive (to the Judicial Conference
or to Congress) than those of the majority.
2. Public Announcements
Second, the conclusions and recommendations at each later
stage of the Judicial Conference process would be posted on the
websites of the particular court and that of the Federal Judiciary.
Even though there would be no formal opportunity for further
comment, there is no reason why interested members of the
legal community should not know how the Judicial Conference
is dealing with these important issues. Further, on rare
occasions, outsiders may have useful information or insights that
will assist the Conference at the next step of the process.
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1V. ASSESSING THE PROPOSAL
I can anticipate three objections to the proposal sketched
here. First, it may be said that a public comment period would
prolong the process through which judgeship requests are
developed. That is probably true, though it may be possible to
compress some existing stages and thus keep the schedule close
to what it is today. In any event, Congress has not been acting
on judgeship requests every two years, or even every four years.
If the consequence is to establish a three- or four-year cycle, that
may be no more than bowing to reality. Unexpected surges in
caseload in particular courts can always be dealt with through
special requests and court-specific legislation, as in the 2002
Department of Justice Authorization Act. 6
Second, it may be argued that very few members of the
legal community have any interest in the details of judgeship
needs. Perhaps so, but the value of comments lies not in their
quantity but in their quality. Bar associations in several circuits
have an admirable history of thoughtful participation in debates
over court structure and process. Moreover, a paucity of
comments could itself be significant. Specifically, if lawyers of
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, after being fully informed about
how their courts of appeals have chosen to cope with the
demands of increased caseload, voice no objection, Congress
might well view that as strong evidence that the status quo is
acceptable.
Third, it may be said that the proposed system would add to
the burdens of the judges who take part in the process. But the
principal changes involve publicizing material that is already
prepared for a limited audience and listening to comments from
interested persons outside the judiciary. These strike me as
rather modest burdens.
On the other side of the balance, I believe that making the
process more open and allowing broader participation would
have three important benefits.
86. See Pub. L. 107-273, § 312 (Nov. 2, 2002), 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (116 Stat.) 1758,
1786. Each of the new judgeships in this bill was recommended by the Judicial
Conference. See The End of the 107th Congress: Budget in Limbo, Third Branch 1, 11
(Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts. Dec. 2002).
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First, Congress would get more of the information that it
needs in order to carry out its constitutional responsibilities for
the administration of justice in the federal courts. This
information would not be limited to the consideration of
judgeship requests; it would also aid Congress in dealing with a
wide range of legislative issues, including modification of court
structure and allocation of resources.
Second, the judges would get information that would help
them in making the policy judgments that fall within the
province of the judiciary. Judgeship requests implicate every
aspect of court operations, particularly the use of non-Article III
personnel and the various forms of interaction with litigants,
lawyers, and citizens. Comments from the legal community on a
court's provisional response to the Statistics Subcommittee
would illuminate these issues and assist the courts in designing
rules and internal operating procedures.
Finally, by involving the legal community in the
formulation of judgeship requests, the courts can build a
constituency that will help them in gaining support for their
initiatives in Congress. For example, the documentation that the
Judicial Conference has submitted in connection with its
judgeship recommendations stands as a powerful argument for
additional resources. I am confident that local bar associations
and others in the legal community would use their influence to
assist the judiciary in securing those resources-if they knew
about the need and had participated in the process that led to the
requests.
VI. CONCLUSION
I share the view expressed in the Long Range Plan for the
Federal Courts that "[t]he growth of the Article III judiciary
should be carefully controlled so that the creation of new
judgeships, while not subject to a numerical ceiling, is limited to
that number necessary to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on
the federal courts."" But the caseload of the courts continues to
grow, and Congress continues to add to their jurisdiction. If we
87. Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 38 (Jud. Conf. of the U.S. 1995)
(Recommendation 16).
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wish to maintain the quality of the justice administered by the
courts, there is no alternative but to create some new judgeships.
The Judicial Conference of the United States has asked
Congress to create eleven judgeships for four of the federal
courts of appeals. This is a modest request that is fully justified
by the increase in appellate caseloads over the last decade and a
half. For that reason, Congress should act speedily to create the
judgeships. Looking to the longer term, I urge the Judicial
Conference to consider modifications of its process that will
allow for broader participation in the formulation of judgeship
requests. A more open process will benefit not only Congress
but the judiciary itself.
